

Message Text

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FROM FISHER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD: FRENCH MEMBERSHIP IN CCD

REFS: (A) STATE 173564; (B) PARIS 17318

1. SUMMARY: US CCD DELEGATION SEES NET ADVANTAGE IN FRENCH MEMBERSHIP IF IT WERE TO EVENTUATE, ALTHOUGH THEIR PRESENCE WILL BRING PROBLEMS. FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WOULD BE WIDELY UNACCEPTABLE AND THE CREATION OF A STEERING GROUP TO INCLUDE THEM WOULD ALSO CREATE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS. ROTATING CHAIRMANSHIP OF CCD AND CONTINUATION ON INFORMAL BASIS OF US-USSR CONSULTATION WOULD SEEM TO BE PREFERABLE. THIS MESSAGE ELABORATES US DEL'S VIEWS ON THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY REFTEL A. END SUMMARY

2. BELIEVE THREE GENERAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CCD.

(1) WHAT WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT IN THE CCD OF
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FRENCH PARTICIPATION? IN PARTICULAR ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OF THE CTB AND CW, WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPLICATIONS OF FRENCH MEMBERSHIP IN THE CCD BOTH FOR THE PRIOR AGREEMENTS TO BE WORKED OUT AMONG THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND THE ELABORATION OF TREATIES IN THE CCD ONCE THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAD COME TO AGREEMENT? IN GENERAL, WOULD THEY BE A CONSTRUCTIVE OR DISRUPTIVE FORCE ON MOST ISSUES?

(2) WHAT WOULD BE THE OVERALL POLITICAL IMPACT OF FRENCH MEMBERSHIP?

(3) WHAT STEPS ARE WE PREPARED TO TAKE TO FACILITATE FRENCH MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING POSSIBLE CHANGES IN CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ARRANGEMENT AND OTHER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES IN CCD?

3. FIRST, ON BALANCE THE NET EFFECT OF FRENCH PRESENCE IN CCD WOULD BE FAVORABLE. NO DOUBT THERE WOULD BE SOME ADDITIONAL BURDENS ON OUR TIME AND PATIENCE. HOWEVER, THE VERY FACT THAT THEY WERE TAKING UP MEMBERSHIP IN CCD RATHER THAN REMAINING OUTSIDE WOULD SUGGEST A CERTAIN POSITIVE SHIFT IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL WHICH US SHOULD WELCOME, NOT DISCOURAGE.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE FRENCH ATTITUDE ON CTB, THEIR MEMBERSHIP IN THE CCD IS LIKELY TO BE MORE OF A BAROMETER THAN A DETERMINANT OF THEIR ATTITUDE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD TRY TO USE THEIR MEMBERSHIP AS AN ARGUMENT FOR SEEKING ADMISSION TO THE TRILATERAL CTB TALKS. WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE AT LEAST TO KEEP THE FRENCH CURRENTLY INFORMED OF THE PROGRESS IN THE TRILATERALS OR EVEN TO HAVE THEM PARTICIPATE IN THE CONSULTATIONS IF THE SOVIETS AGREE, WHICH IS NOT OUT OF THE QUESTION. THE REAL PROBLEM FOR US WOULD BE WHAT WOULD THEY DO WHEN THE CCD TOOK UP A CTB TREATY? WE MIGHT FIND THE SECRET

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FRENCH IN A SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE POSITION AS THEY MIGHT STILL WISH TO CONTINUE NUCLEAR TESTING BEYOND THE DATE WHEN THE OTHER THREE NUCLEAR POWERS WERE WILLING TO STOP. ALSO THEY WOULD SUFFER FROM THEIR PAST TRACK RECORD WHICH HAS AROUSED SOME ANIMOSITY IN THE THIRD WORLD. HOWEVER, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE USEFUL FOR THE FRENCH TO BE ABLE TO HAVE THEIR POSITIONS HEARD AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT WOULD TEND TO CREATE PRESSURES FOR THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY. EVEN IF THEY WOULD NOT GAIN ALL THEY WANTED, HOWEVER, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD WANT TO ACCEPT THE ONUS OF BLOCKING A CTB. THEREFORE WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WOULD ALLOW A TREATY TO EMERGE DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT JOINING IT.

5. ON CW THE PICTURE IS LESS MIXED, IT BEING ONE OF SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES ON WHICH THE FRENCH POSITION APPEARS TO BE NOT TOO DISTANT FROM OURS, ALTHOUGH, AS ON MANY OTHER ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS, THEIR POSITION IS SPICED WITH A HEALTHY DOSE OF SCEPTICISM.

6. ON A MORE GENERAL LEVEL THIS FRENCH SKEPTICISM WILL NOT BE BAD AS THE FRENCH HAVE A CAPACITY FOR MAKING US LOOK AT THE MUSHY ASPECT OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS AND THEY HAVE

LESS COMPUNCTION THAN WE ABOUT EXPOSING THE ABSURDITIES OF SOME OF THE THIRD WORLD POSITIONS AND RHETORIC.

7. SECOND, WITH RESPECT TO THE OVERALL POLITICAL IMPACT OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE CCD, IT WOULD BE WIDELY REGARDED AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT. IT WOULD BRING TO THE CCD A FORMERLY RECALCITRANT NUCLEAR POWER AND RAISE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION WITH FIVE OF THE SIX STATES WHICH HAVE CONDUCTED NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS THEN BEING MEMBERS. ANY DECISION

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BY A FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO JOIN THE CCD WOULD PROBABLY BE TAKEN AS A SIGN THAT FRANCE WAS MOVING CLOSER TO THE GENERAL WESTERN POSITION ON DISARMAMENT.

8. THIRD, THE SOVIET NOTE IN REFTEL (A) REFERS TO FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CO-CHAIRMANSHIP. PRESENT CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ARRANGEMENT IS NOT PERFECT, IS THE CAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE FIFTEEN AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE ATTACK IN UN, BOTH THIS FALL AND IN SPECIAL SESSION, BUT A FRENCH, USSR, US TRIUMVIRATE WOULD CLEARLY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO OTHERS, PARTICULARLY UK. IF THE ROUTE OF ENLARGING CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WERE TO BE PURSUED, CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO CREATION OF A STEERING GROUP. THERE ARE CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON IN ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT: THAT THERE WOULD BE PROVISION FOR A US SEAT ON THE STEERING GROUP AT ALL TIMES, THAT THE MEMBERSHIP BE REASONABLY BALANCED AND THAT THE GROUP BE

KEPT LIMITED IN SIZE.

9. THESE REQUIREMENTS SUGGEST A STEERING GROUP COMPOSED
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OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS -- US, USSR, UK AND FRANCE PLUS
ROTATING MEMBERS FROM EACH OF THE THREE MAIN BLOCS. THE
AWKWARDNESS ABOUT THIS FORMULA IS THAT THREE OF THE FOUR
PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE WOULD BE WESTERN
NATIONS. YET, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN GROUP WOULD
OBVIOUSLY NOT SIT STILL FOR BEING EXCLUDED MERELY IN ORDER
TO ENSURE THAT THE OTHER TWO BLOCS HAD A PROPORTIONATE
SHARE OF THE MEMBERSHIP. THERE ARE MANY FORMULAE WHICH COULD
BE DEvised, E.G., HAVE THE COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF THE FOUR
NUCLEAR POWERS PLUS ONE ROTATING MEMBER FROM THE WESTERN GROUP,
ONE OR TWO FROM THE EASTERN GROUP, AND TWO FROM THE NON-
ALIGNED, GIVING A TOTAL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF EIGHT OR NINE.

10. THE CREATION OF A GROUP OF THIS SIZE MIGHT DIMINISH THE
EFFICIENCY OF A STEERING COMMITTEE AND INCREASE TENSIONS
WITH EXCLUDED NON-ALIGNED. IF FRENCH ARE SERIOUSLY PURSUING
MATTER, BEST SOLUTION WOULD APPEAR TO BE ABOLISH TITLE OF
CO-CHAIRMAN RELYING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN ROTATING CHAIRMAN
AND SECRETARIAT, BUT CONTINUE THE SAME LEVEL OF US-USSR
CONSULTATION AS NOW EXISTS. SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE
BASED ON RECOGNITION THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY REALITIES
REQUIRE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT,
TO BE EFFECTIVE, MUST BE ADHERED TO BY THOSE TWO
COUNTRIES. THIS TACIT US-USSR SPECIFIC RELATIONSHIP WOULD
HAVE TO BE TOLERATED BY THE OTHER MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE
FRENCH THEMSELVES. AT TIMES, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL
FOUR NUCLEAR STATES WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT ON ISSUES LYING
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE AND ADVISE THE TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN AND
THERE WOULD BE OTHER QUESTIONS ON WHICH US-USSR CONSULTATION
WOULD HAVE TO BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE CERTAIN KEY NON-ALIGNED
DELEGATIONS.

11. TWO OTHER PROBLEMS IN PARIS CABLE 17818 DO NOT CURRENTLY
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APPEAR TO BE MANAGEABLE IN THE MANNER FRENCH INDICATE THAT
THEY WISH. IF "NON-REPRESENTEDNESS OF CCD" MEANS ANYTHING
MORE THEN ABSENCE OF CHINA, THIS IS NOT AN ACCURATE CHARACTER-
IZATION FOR A BODY DEALING WITH ARMS CONTROL. IF IT REFERS SIMPLY
TO THE ABSENCE OF CHINA, THIS WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE CORRECTABLE
IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, ALTHOUGH ACTIVE PARTICIPATION

BY FRENCH MIGHT BE FIRST STEP LOOKING TOWARD SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

12. WITH RESPECT TO FRENCH COMPLAINT ABOUT THE "SECOND AND THIRD LEVEL" ISSUES, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE CURRENT MILITARY REALITIES WHICH HAVE MADE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT IS DISCUSSED IN THE CCD AND WHAT IS DISCUSSED ON A BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL BASIS WOULD BE APPRECIABLY CHANGED BY PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH. IN ANY EVENT, DO NOT BELIEVE FRENCH WOULD ARGUE CTB OR CW ARE SECOND OR THIRD LEVEL ISSUES. IN VIEW OF FRENCH TAKING THEMSELVES OUT OF MBFR DISCUSSIONS, THIS WOULD APPEAR TO LEAVE SALT AS SOLE ISSUE WHICH IS IMPORTANT BUT EXCLUDED FROM THEIR CONSIDERATION AS MEMBER OF CCD.

13. COMMENT: NO PROBLEM WITH PROPOSED ANSWER TO SOVIETS OR SHOWING IT TO FRENCH, BUT WISH TO REGISTER CONCERN OVER SUGGESTION IN SOVIET NOTE THAT CO-CHAIRMANSHIP MIGHT BE ENLARGED TO A THREE NATION GROUP AND TO POINT OUT DISADVANTAGES OF LARGER STEERING COMMITTEE. ABOLISHING THE TITLE OF CO-CHAIRMAN AND SUBSTITUTING INFORMAL CONSULTATION AS INDICATED ABOVE SEEMS PREFERABLE. VANDEN HEUVEL

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